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Abstract
This paper evaluates whether immigration can mitigate the Dutch disease effects
associated with booms in natural resource sectors. We derive predicted changes in
the size of the non-tradable sector from a small general-equilibrium model a` la
Obstfeld-Rogoff. Using data for Canadian provinces, we find evidence that aggre-
gate immigration mitigates the increase in the size of the non-tradable sector in
booming regions. The mitigation effect is due mostly to interprovincial migration
and temporary foreign workers. There is no evidence of such an effect for perma-
nent international immigration. Interprovincial migration also results in a spreading
effect of Dutch disease from booming to non-booming provinces.
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1 Introduction
“Dutch disease” is considered one of the fundamental mechanisms explaining the so-called
“natural resource curse,” i.e., the process by which the extraction of a natural resource
can lead to a decrease in overall welfare in the long run.1 The “disease” is evidenced
by an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a factor reallocation between sectors
(triggered by the windfall income due to the resource extraction). These effects are in
turn detrimental to the trade-exposed manufacturing base of a booming economy (Corden
and Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984). This leads to what is sometimes called “premature de-
industrialization” (Palma, 2008).2 Such a phenomenon is obviously a main threat for
resource-rich developed economies with sound institutions and well-protected property
rights, economies such as Norway, Australia, and Canada (Gylfason, 2011). Solutions to
overcome the Dutch disease are not straightforward since the problem involves market
mechanisms for which it is difficult to control.3 The implied policy question is how the
government can minimize the occurrence of Dutch disease in an economy characterized
by natural resource extraction.4
1The negative correlation between natural resource endowment and growth has been coined the ”nat-
ural resource curse” in cross-country studies by Auty (1993) and Sachs and Warner (2001). Recent
surveys are provided by van der Ploeg (2011) and Frankel (2010). The natural resource curse includes
various mechanisms potentially detrimental to growth. Channels other than Dutch disease involve over-
consumption and deviation from the Hartwick rule (Hartwick, 1977; Solow, 1986). The abundance of
natural resources might also favour rent-seeking activities and complicate the enforcement of property
rights through corruption, conflicts, wars, and predation (Ross, 1999). It has also been shown that the
curse goes through lower levels of human capital in resource-rich economies (Gylfason, 2001).
2The rise of economic activities such as tourism and financial services can also generate an appreciation
of the currency and a contraction of the trade-exposed manufacturing sector. The Dutch disease is usually
associated with natural resources because their exploitation is often characterized with booms and busts.
This results from the fact that prices of natural resources are much more volatile in international markets
than the prices of services and manufacturing goods.
3One open question is whether Dutch disease is really a “disease” since the welfare implications are not
straightforward. We nevertheless consider this a detrimental development in the long run, especially in
the specific case of exhaustible resources. According to Krugman (1987) and Venables (1996), for instance,
a significant decrease in the size of the manufacturing sector is dangerous at least for two reasons. First,
because of non-convexities, below a critical mass, it is difficult for the manufacturing sector to rebound
when the resource boom is exhausted. Second, the manufacturing sector exerts positive externalities on
the whole economy, for example, through learning-by-doing effects and technology adoption (Sachs and
Warner, 1995; Torvik, 2001). This means that even in a growing economy, a too low relative size of the
manufacturing sector might be detrimental in the long run.
4Norway, a highly centralized country with good institutions, has gone one step further in countering
the potential effect of Dutch disease with the creation of a sovereign wealth fund, the second largest in
the world, that contains mainly assets in foreign currencies. One of the aims of this diversification is to
avoid the over-evaluation of the currency and the resulting Dutch disease. Such an implementation of the
Hartwick rule, however, can hardly be put into practice in highly decentralized countries such as Canada
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The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Dutch disease can be overcome or at
least mitigated through a specific market mechanism, that can be market driven, namely,
immigration of workers. In the basic model (Corden and Neary, 1982), two specific
effects can lead to a decrease in the competitiveness of the trade-exposed manufacturing
sector. The first, and most straightforward one, goes through the spending effect that
leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a rise in the size of the non-tradable
sector.5 The second mechanism relies on the reallocation of labour from the trade-exposed
manufacturing sector to the resource and the non-tradable sectors. While our contribution
is mainly empirical, we first develop a theoretical open macroeconomic model a` la Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996, Chap. 4), with a varying labour supply, in which the resource boom is
modelled as an incoming external income or windfall. The change in the labour supply
relaxes the most binding constraint in terms of factor availability. Indeed, while capital is
an important production factor, the perfect mobility of capital within Canada on the one
hand, and the high mobility of capital between Canada and the rest of the world on the
other hand ensures that capital availability is high in each province. We derive the effects
on the non-tradable sector of the windfall and of the effects of a labour force varying
in size due to immigration. Without immigration, the squeezing of the manufacturing
trade-exposed sector and the windfall coming from the resource boom inflate the relative
size of the non-tradable sector. This impact is mitigated via an inflow of workers coming
from abroad.
We test the predictions of our theoretical model by making the best use of a rich
Canadian regional dataset on sectoral production, employment, and migration. More
precisely, we use panel data from 1987 to 2007 for the 10 Canadian provinces. For several
reasons, the use of regional Canadian data is particularly appealing for assessing the
Dutch disease and the mitigation effect of immigration. First, in general, it is difficult in
cross-country analysis to disentangle pure Dutch disease effects from other factors, such
and Australia, where natural resources are under provincial jurisdiction.
5Evidence of a link between real exchange rate appreciation and commodity prices is due to Chen and
Rogoff (2003a) and Cashin et al. (2004). Evidence in favour of such a mechanism in the specific case of
Canada has been provided by several authors, including Beine et al. (2012). There is recent evidence of
real exchange rate appreciation due to incoming remittances (Acosta et al., 2009) and to positive shocks
to commodity prices (Bodart et al., 2012).
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as institutions. Endogeneity is a delicate issue to handle, given that both the quality
of governments and institutions, and the intensity of natural resources extraction might
be the result of growth performance instead of the cause. By focusing on regions within
the same country, regions that share very similar institutions and culture, it is easier to
estimate pure Dutch disease effects. Second, Canadian regions are quite heterogeneous in
terms of industrial structure. Some provinces are richly endowed with natural resources
while others rely mostly on the manufacturing sector. The recent boom in Alberta’s tar
sands production and in Newfoundland’s offshore oil fields provides a kind of natural
experiment. Third, labour mobility at the regional level comes from various patterns that
facilitate identification of the mitigation effect.
Three different migration channels are operative in the case of Canadian provinces.
The first channel concerns international permanent migrants arriving under the traditional
point system, in which immigrants are selected by federal authorities on the basis of
observable individual characteristics.6 Second, temporary foreign worker programs have
been gradually launched by migration authorities in the last 20 years. Interestingly,
both the timing and intensity of those programs turn out to be very different across
provinces. Finally, we use interprovincial migrant data that allow us to capture net
internal immigration flows as well as gross inflows and outflows for each province. Some
papers have used intra-state regional data to empirically test for growth effects coming
from the resource curse (see van der Ploeg, 2011, for references). To the best of our
knowledge, our analysis of the Dutch disease effects on the employment level is the first
analysis that involves regions of the same country. It is also the first paper looking
empirically at the role of immigration as a mitigation mechanism for Dutch disease.
Our paper is related to several threads in existing Canadian literature. First, it com-
plements results of recent Canadian studies showing that migration flows exert some
effect on regional labour markets. Using time-series and cross-sectional data, the empiri-
cal analysis of Gross and Schmitt (2012) shows that the magnitude of temporary worker
programs is sufficient to exert a significant effect on the persistence of regional unemploy-
6The province of Quebec, however, has been selecting its own permanent economic migrants since
1991.
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ment rates. Our study also confirms previous findings that Dutch disease might have a
regional/industrial dimension in Canada. Using a computable general-equilibrium model
at the industry level, Dissou (2010) shows that an increase in the price of oil is beneficial
to the overall Canadian economy but exerts a negative effect on some industries. The
results of the empirical analysis of Beine et al. (2012) suggest that the Canadian dollar
is driven by energy prices and that the sharp appreciation of the currency between 2002
and 2007 has been detrimental to the trade-exposed manufacturing sectors.
The main findings of our paper are the following. First, we find in Canada a Dutch
disease effect in the form of a rise in the share of the non-tradable sector. Second, the
immigration of workers into the booming provinces exerts a mitigating influence on the
Dutch disease. The rise of the non-tradable sector is lower if the labour supply tends
to increase due to the inflow of workers. This finding is fully consistent with the so-
called “Alberta effect” as originally identified by Helliwell (1981) and Corden (1984).
The inflow of workers seeking to share in the rents in the booming provinces leads to
a mitigation effect of the Dutch disease. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations based
on our estimates and applied to the province that is booming the most, namely, Alberta,
suggest that about half of the increase in the non-tradable sector triggered by the resource
income has been mitigated by the inflow of workers. Third, the mitigation effect is stronger
with interprovincial migration flows and immigration flows associated with the temporary
foreign worker programs. In contrast, immigration of permanent migrants does not seem
to mitigate Dutch disease. We ascribe this to the different sensitivities of the migration
flows to labour market imbalances.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a small theoretical model. Section
3 describes the econometric approach. Section 4 presents the data, while Section 5 reports
the results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Theoretical Background
In this section, we present the results of a simple general-equilibrium model capturing the
effects of a resource boom, the so-called Dutch disease effect, as well as the mitigation
effect exerted by inflow of workers into the economy. We develop a small open-economy
model with two explicit sectors, the trade-exposed manufacturing (lagging) sector T ,
and the non-tradable sector N . The resource sector is not modelled explicitly but is
captured through a windfall R. The model builds on the well-known framework of Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996), which has been used extensively to capture the dynamics of real
exchange rates and relative sector sizes in a small open economy characterized by full
capital mobility. The model is extended here to include a resource windfall and a varying
labour supply. This framework is relevant in the context of our analysis that focuses
on the dynamics of Canadian provinces. Canadian provinces are fully integrated and
Canada as a whole is relatively well connected to the international financial markets.
Furthermore, each provincial economy is relatively small, implying that the provincial
economies are price takers on the international goods markets. They have no influence on
the world interest rate nor its terms of trade, including the export price of their primary
commodities.
We relax the assumption of fixed labour by assuming that labour supply can be ad-
justed through an inflow or outflow of workers.7 Since our empirical analysis will use
Canadian regional data, it is understood that the inflow of workers into the booming re-
gions can come from either international or interregional migration. Both types of inflow
contribute to the mitigation effect. However, an inflow into the booming regions stem-
ming from internal migration decreases the labour force in non-booming regions. With
this migration channel, Dutch disease can be propagated to non-booming regions by a
labour-reallocation effect.
In the basic Dutch disease model of Corden and Neary (1982), the economy is divided
7The idea that migration may have important effects on countries that experience a sudden income
surge is not new and has already been considered theoretically by Corden (1984), Wahba (1998) and
van der Ploeg (2011). Caselli and Michaels (2013) nevertheless observe that interregional migration flows
have not happened following oil windfalls among Brazilian communities.
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into three sectors: the resource (booming) sector B, the trade-exposed manufacturing
(lagging) sector T , and the non-tradable sector N . A resource boom occurring in B is
detrimental to sector T because of two effects that are mutually reinforcing. First, the
extra exports from sector B contribute to an appreciation of the real exchange rate of the
economy, decreasing the demand for sector T output. The income generated from sector
B increases the demand for sector N , contributing also to the appreciation of the real
exchange rate. This is the spending effect. Second, the boom in sector B, and the resulting
expansion of the N sector, increase the demand for factors in the economy. In the usual
approach to modelling Dutch disease, labour is fixed and capital domestically mobile.
Consequently, the boom in sector B and the expansion of sector N increase the scarcity
of labour, contributing to a further decline in sector T through a labour-reallocation effect
(the so-called resource movement effect). Both contribute to an increase in the relative
size of sector N with respect to sector T .
Our model deviates from the core Dutch disease model in two specific ways. First, the
booming sector here is captured by a resource windfallR. We abstract from the production
process in sector B and concentrate on the effect of the windfall on the relative size of
sector N .8
Second, our model assumes homogeneous factors that are mobile across sectors. In the
basic model, Corden and Neary (1982) assume one sector-specific factor (capital) and one
mobile factor (labour) and amend the model to allow for capital mobility between the two
non-resource sectors. Our model should be seen as capturing the long-run adjustment of
the economy to the resource boom when all factors are allowed to adjust. Our theoretical
results regarding the Dutch disease effect can be compared with the ones obtained by
8In this respect, we follow a large part of the theoretical literature (see for instance van der Ploeg,
2011) on the Dutch disease. This assumption is relevant and harmless in our case. First, resource sectors
in Canada (tar sand oil, sea oil wells, potash) are very capital intensive. Second, the size of the resource
sector in terms of employment is quite limited, even in resource-rich provinces like Alberta. To illustrate,
for non-booming provinces, the average share of the resource sector in terms of employment is less than 1
per cent. For Alberta, over our investigation period, it oscillates between 4 and 6 per cent of the labour
force. For Newfoundland and Saskatchewan, it ranges between 2 and 4 per cent. Finally, adding a third
resource sector turns out to lead to a very similar testable equation at equilibrium. With respect to the
one considered in this paper, this would lead to including the change in resource sector productivity as
the only additional covariate in the equilibrium condition. The results of the growth accounting study
by Coulombe (2011) suggest that productivity growth in the natural resource sector can be picked up by
the sophisticated error term that we are using in the empirical analysis.
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Corden and Neary (1982) in the specific case of capital mobility between the two sectors.
Furthermore, the use of a dynamic panel-data model in the econometric framework allows
us to capture long-run effects of the resource boom and immigration.
From the model, we derive the prediction regarding the relative size of sector N in
the economy in relation to the windfall and the size of the labour force. This relationship
will be the focus of the paper and will be estimated in the empirical section. We present
here the main structure of the model as well as the two equilibrium relationships. The
full derivation can be found in Appendix A.
2.1 Firms
There are two sectors, one producing tradable goods and the other, non-tradable goods.
The two sectors are represented by two representative firms. These firms follow Cobb-
Douglas technology in a perfectly competitive market.
YN = ANK
αN
N (nL)
1−αN , (1)
YT = ATK
αT
T ((1− n)L)
1−αT , (2)
αi ≤ 1 for i = N, T.
with N for non-traded goods and T for traded ones. Both sectors N and T will draw
labour from the total labour force, L, so that the non-tradable sector has a share n and
the tradable sector the share (1 − n). Total factor productivity Ai is exogenous for each
sector. Capital, Ki, is assumed to be fully mobile both between sectors and internationally.
Tradable goods compete on the world market, and their price is taken as nume´raire. The
price of the non-tradable goods in terms of tradable goods, p, can then be interpreted as
the terms of trade.
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2.2 Households
Consumers maximize utility in the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods.9
Aggregate utility takes the following CES-function in those two goods,
U =
[
γ
1/θ(CT )
θ−1/θ + (1− γ)
1/θ(CN)
θ−1/θ
]θ/θ−1
, (3)
with aggregate budget constraint,
Z = CT + pCN = wL+ r(Q+R). (4)
The parameters γ and θ define the choice between traded and non-traded goods in the
utility function, where θ is the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. Consumer
income consists of wages from labour and interest from capital ownership. Q represents
the total capital owned by citizens, both domestically and abroad. Under the assumption
of full capital mobility, capital will move and adjust to changes in labour. For convenience,
it is assumed that such capital flows will not change the total capital wealth Q existing
in the economy.10 For instance, part of the economy’s productive capital may be foreign
owned and other flows can be compensated for by the net foreign asset position of domestic
consumers. The resource windfall increases the budget constraint of consumers through
an additional capital stock, R. This stock, contrary to the other capital stock (Q), is
taken as variable and is entirely domestically owned.
2.3 Equilibrium
The model can be solved using the first-order conditions for production factors and con-
sumption as well as the condition that domestically produced non-tradable goods need
9There is no differentiation between consumption behavior of natives and potential new migrants. We
believe that empirically there is no clear need to so for the type of analysis that we aim for.
10As explained by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), this is equivalent to saying that, in the steady state,
national consumption equals income with constant national financial wealth Q. National wealth Q is also
equal to B+δ(KN +KT ) where B is the economy’s foreign assets, and δ the (constant) share of domestic
ownership of domestic capital. Under full capital mobility, a rise (resp. decrease) in KN +KT might be
financed (resp. offset) by a proportional fall (resp. rise) in B, leaving total national wealth Q unaffected.
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to be consumed domestically (CN = YN). The solution boils down to a two-equation
system for p and n that can be expressed as a function of all exogenous variables,
Q, R, AN , AT and L. One can take log-differences to express the relationships as
relative changes in those variables. This results in a linear form of changes in equilibrium
values, where in general hatted values represent log-differences xˆ = d ln x.
Solving for pˆ , one gets:
pˆ =
1− αN
1− αT
AˆT − AˆN . (5)
Equation (1) can be rewritten such that the share of employment in the non-tradable
sector is a function of the production variables:
n =
YN
ANk
αN
N L
. (6)
As emphasized in footnote 3, the share n, rather than the absolute number of employment,
is the relevant measure used in the literature for analysis between cross-sections and over
time. Solving for nˆ finally leads to the key testable implication of the model. The key
relationship is expressed in terms of the change in the relative size of the non-tradable
sector as a result of changes in the conditions of the economy:
nˆ =
ψL
1− αT
AˆT −
αN
1− αN
AˆN −
(
γθ + (1− γ) +
αN
1− αN
)
pˆ+ r
dR
GNP
− (1− ψL)Lˆ. (7)
Before switching to the estimation of (7), a few comments are in order.
First, equation (5) is nothing but the traditional Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson relation-
ship relating the evolution of the real exchange rate to the evolution of the productivities
in both non-resource sectors. This equilibrium relationship has given rise to an exten-
sive empirical literature testing for its relevance in cross-country studies (see for instance
de Gregorio et al. (1994) among many others). As emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996), under full capital mobility, the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson relationship holds re-
gardless of assumptions relative to the demand side of the model. pˆ is driven only by
10
supply factors such as the evolution of productivities in both sectors. As a result, since
the Dutch disease effect in this model is introduced through the windfall R in the con-
sumer budget constraint, pˆ does not depend on R. The Dutch disease effects show up
only in the equation governing nˆ, which explains why we focus on equation (7) in the
empirical part.
Second, it is important to note that the solution involves a system of two independent
equations in the sense that pˆ does not depend on nˆ. This allows us to estimate each
equation separately. We focus only on equation (7) since Dutch disease effects are spe-
cific to this relationship. The estimation of equation (5) is also much less relevant here,
given that we focus on regions of the same country rather than on different countries.
Furthermore, the validity of the PPP relationship in the short to medium run has been
questioned empirically in a large set of studies, suggesting that, in practice, there might
exist large deviations from the equilibrium captured in equation (5).11
Third, the previous point explains that we use a semi-structural and not a fully struc-
tural form of the model. Since we can construct observable values for pˆ for each province, it
might be better to use equation (7) directly rather than substitute further the equilibrium
value of pˆ. Large empirical deviations from equation (5) might lead to significant mea-
surement errors in pˆ or can even lead to some estimation bias of parameters in equation
(7) if those deviations are correlated to deviations in this equation.
Fourth, equation (7) predicts how the relative size of the non-tradable sector reacts
to changes in exogenous variables. The main insights drawn from the relationship are
the following. First and foremost, the equation illustrates the Dutch disease phenomenon
in the form of a positive relationship between the windfall R and the relative size of the
N sector. The positive elasticity is related to the so-called spending effect. As shown
by Corden and Neary (1982), the spending effect leads to an increase of the N sector
and a decrease of the T sector, regardless of the assumptions regarding capital mobility.
This spending effect is here proportional to the share of capital revenues in total income.
Secondly, since −
(
γθ + (1− γ) + αN
1−αN
)
< 0, an increase in the relative price of the
11See, for instance, Taylor and Taylor (2004).
11
non-traded goods (pˆ > 0) will dampen the positive impact on n of the resource windfall
through a reduction in demand for those goods. This depends on the specific value of the
demand parameters, γ and θ.12
Finally, the model allows us to identify the role of a change in the total labour supply
available to the traded and non-traded sectors, Lˆ. This impact might be related to the
resource movement effect, to the migration impact, or to both. Consider first the case
with no migration. In that case, Lˆ < 0 is due to the resource movement effect. The
resource movement effect requires the expansion of the resource sector to attract labour,
reducing the total labour supply available to the N and T sectors. In practice, while the
resource sector is very capital intensive in Canada, it still attracts some labour. The well-
known story of weekly flights between St. John’s, Newfoundland, and Fort McMurray in
Northern Alberta at the heart of the Athabasca region illustrates the attraction of the oil
sector for workers. In turn, the labour attraction of the resource sector implies that there
is definitely a case for an existing resource movement effect in Canada even though its size
might be limited, given the modest share of labour employed in the sector. Given that
ψL < 1, the resource movement effect amplifies the spending effect in our model. This
is consistent with the results of Corden and Neary (1982), obtained under full capital
mobility between sectors and with the T sector being more capital intensive than the N
sector. With labour mobility across provinces and across countries, L can also change
with emigration and immigration. Equation (7) makes clear that aggregate immigration,
which leads to Lˆ > 0, will offset the resource movement effect (if any) and will mitigate the
spending effect associated with R. This is especially the case since provinces that benefit
from a resource boom will tend to attract more workers from outside, an aspect of the
“Alberta effect” (Helliwell, 1981). Conversely, (provincial) emigration (Lˆ < 0) generates
an effect similar to the resource movement effect, reinforcing the spending effect at stake.
12More specifically, the basic mechanisms of the spending effect are as follows. The windfall R generates
a rise in the demand for all goods, i.e. from both sectors. Given the capacity constraint of the N sector
and for a given value of p and L, the increase in the supply of the non-traded goods can be fulfilled only
by drawing on labour employed in the T sector. This in turn results in an increase in n. Immigration
relaxes the binding constraint of the total labour force, thereby dampening the effect of n.
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3 Empirical Model and Econometric Specification
The empirical literature related to Dutch disease can be separated into two strands
(van der Ploeg, 2011). The first looks at the price effect and tests whether the real
exchange rate appreciates as a result of a resource boom or a windfall (Beine et al., 2012;
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Bodart et al., 2012; Chen and Rogoff, 2003b). An
alternative strand tests the relationship between the resource windfall and the evolution
of the economic structure (i.e. the shift away from tradable production).There are fewer
studies looking at the latter.13 We follow this route and test equation (7) directly, relating
the share of the non-tradable sector in the economy and the resource boom.
More precisely, equation (7) describes a theoretical relationship between the growth
rate in the share of service sector workers and a list of determinants. In this section,
we show how this set-up is tested using Canadian regional data where changes to the
labour force are driven by interprovincial and international immigration. Given the small
number of Canadian provinces (10), we cannot rely only on the cross-section dimension
for the empirical analysis. We believe, however, that the great quality and consistency
across provinces and through time of the Canadian regional data more than compensate
for the small number of cross sections.
To make the best use of the available information, we use a time-series dimension by
pooling annual data for the 10 provinces over the 1987-2007 period. Consistent with our
theoretical model, we estimate a dynamic panel-data model that allows us to account
for long-run effects of resource boom and emigration. Furthermore, in the presence of
adjustment costs, employment and industrial structures differ in the short run from their
long-run equilibrium.14 In this perspective, an empirical version of equation (7) takes the
general following structure:
∆ni,t = ξni,t−1 + β
′xi,t + ui,t (8)
13Acosta et al. (2009); Harding and Venables (2013); Acosta et al. (2008). See also the stylized facts
of Palma (2008).
14For instance, Arellano and Bond (1991) have tested employment adjustment using a dynamic panel-
data model similar to our model.
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where ∆ni,t is the change in the size of the non-tradable sector in province i between
time t and t − 1; xi,t is a vector of controls including measures for the key theoretical
determinants, i.e. AˆT , AˆN , pˆ,
dR
GNP
and Lˆ. The ui,t are modelled with time dummies,
cross-section fixed effects, and an idiosyncratic error term.
In this framework, the estimated β’s are the short-run and −ξ/β are the long-run
effects on the share of employment. Unlike the real exchange rate response to a resource
boom, the shift from the tradable sector toward the non-tradable one requires some ad-
justment of the entire industrial structure. This adjustment can take some time, best
captured by long-run changes rather than the short-run effect of the boom. This also
explains why we rest on a dynamic panel data model.15 A necessary condition for the
stability of the underlying adjustment mechanism is that the estimated ξ is smaller than
zero.
The empirical specification does differ from the theoretical model because it includes
the time dimension. The theoretical model (7) is purely static. In such a framework,
nˆ = dln(n) correspond to the percentage change in the employment share between two
equilibria. In equation (8), the dependent variable is nt − nt−1 and it is regressed on its
lagged value and a list of controls. This dynamic specification is justified by the empirical
findings that the speed of adjustment (the parameter on the lagged dependent variable)
is proportional to the difference between the initial and the new equilibrium employment
share. The theory is unfortunately silent on that. Consequently, the parameters in
equation (8) do not strictly correspond to those in equation (7) for the same variable.
For example, the theoretical parameter of the resource windfall in (7) is proportional
to the interest rate. In (8), it is the interest rate times the employment share of the N
sector. Furthermore, the empirical analysis clearly shows that it is the level of the relative
price of services, instead of its growth rate -as predicted by the theory-, that affects
the long-run equilibrium share of employment. Consequently, a permanent level shift in
the relative price of non traded goods would according to the results of the empirical
specification affect the equilibrium share of employment. This is slightly different from
15Harding and Venables (2013) adopt the same philosophy by estimating a panel-data model with
proxies for lagged and contemporaneous windfall shocks.
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what is predicted by the theoretical specification.
The estimation of equation (8) requires the use of proxies for the vector of controls
xi,t. The growth of multifactor productivity for the manufacturing T sector (AˆT ) and the
N sector (AˆN) appears in (7). In equation (9), because of data availability, we use labour
productivity growth in both sectors. Consequently, the contribution of capital stock
growth to productivity is included in the error terms (fixed effects, time dummies, or the
idiosyncratic component). In the benchmark regressions, migration is assumed to be the
only important driver of changes to the labour forces Lˆ.16 We use three components of
migration: interprovincial migration, permanent international migration, and temporary
foreign workers. In most of our regressions, interprovincial migration is measured as a
net concept. This implies that, contrary to the other two components, net interprovincial
migration for one particular province can be positive or negative. One person moving from
Ontario to Alberta is recorded twice, once negatively for Ontario and once positively for
Alberta. We also present results in some regressions with gross interprovincial immigration
and emigration introduced separately.
Thus, in order to match the theoretical model with observable measures of the vari-
ables, the following regression model is estimated:
∆ni,t = ξni,t−1 + β1∆.mlpi,t + β2∆.slpi,t + β3Ri,t + β4TTi,t + β5migi,t + λi + θt + i,t
(9)
where λi and θt are respectively, provincial and temporal fixed effects. The inclusion
of provincial and temporal fixed effects is a key advantage of model (9). Their inclusion
minimizes the likelihood of important mispecification biases that could lead to improper
estimates of key parameters such as the coefficients of the windfall, β3, and migration,
β5. For instance, if resource-rich provinces display different characteristics in terms of
16In the robustness section (see section 5.3.1), we relax this assumption and account for additional
changes in the labour supply through variation in the provincial participation rates. Note that unlike
participation rates, changes in the active native population due to demographic trends are, first, not
quantitatively important, especially compared with immigration and emigration. Second, those changes
are quite similar across provinces and thereby best captured by time fixed effects. An additional advantage
to using migration as an indicator of Lˆ is that those changes are exogenous with respect to L, which is
used in the definition of the dependent variable.
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industrial structure, failure to account for those through λi (through for instance the
use of a pooled OLS estimator) could lead to inconsistent estimates. Likewise, failure
to include θt could lead to biased estimates if all Canadian provinces experienced some
structural deindustrialization over the investigation period.
The term ∆.mlpi,t proxies AˆT , i.e. productivity growth in the tradable sector, while
∆.slpi,t proxies AˆN , i.e. productivity growth in the non-tradable sector. Ri,t captures the
annual resource income experienced in province i, while TTi,t is a measure of the terms
of trade p and migi,t is the total migration flow entering province i at time t. That is,
the variable migi,t is the sum of three different types of migration flows: net interprovin-
cial immigration, immigration under the temporary working program implemented after
1985, and permanent economic immigration under the traditional Canadian immigration
procedures (in particular, the point system). First we look at the role for aggregate immi-
gration, summing up the various types of migration flows. Next, we look at the respective
roles for each type of immigration since they gather different types of migrants in terms of
skills and responsiveness to market shocks. Finally, we further deconstruct net provincial
immigration into gross immigration and gross emigration.
While the panel structure with province and time fixed effects minimizes the likelihood
of a correlation between migi,t and i,t, there is still a case for endogeneity in specification
(9). Endogeneity could arise as a result of reverse causality between between ∆ni,t and
migi,t. It can also arise if unobservable shocks to ∆ni,t influence immigration in province
i at time t. In a first step, we consider immigration flows (and other variables such as R)
as exogenous and proceed directly to the estimation. Then, in the robustness section, we
discuss in more details the case of endogeneity of the various immigration flows and carry
out alternative estimations aiming at dealing with it.
A key objective of our paper is to test for a possible mitigation effect induced by im-
migration. Two complementary approaches might be used to assess the existence of such
an effect. First, if migration flows to booming provinces tend to dampen Dutch disease,
the point estimate of the resource windfall would be underestimated when estimating
equation (9) without migration flows. The influence of migration flows would then be in-
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cluded in the residual and the estimation would suffer from omitted variable bias, unless
immigration does not affect the economic structure. The bias is likely to be important
given the fact that Ri,t and migi,t are likely to be positively correlated. Indeed, booming
provinces will tend to attract migrants either from the rest of the country or from abroad.
This is obviously related to the so-called Alberta effect as identified by Helliwell (1981)
and Corden (1984). In Canada, resource rents are taxed at the provincial level and key
services such as education and health are provided by provincial governments. Conse-
quently booming provinces can attract public rent seeking migrants looking for better
public services at lower tax rates.
The previously evoked estimation bias will be corrected when migration flows are
entered in the list of controls. In this case, the mitigation effect implies that the point
estimate of Ri,t (β3) increases when immigration flows are included in the regressions
and that the point estimate of migi,t, β5 is negative. This approach nevertheless neglects
the fact that the mitigation effect of migration might depend on the amplitude of the
Dutch disease effect and hence on the size of Ri,t. To that aim, a second approach for
estimating the mitigation effect is to augment specification (9) by adding an interaction
term composed of the product ofRi,t andmigi,t. In this set-up, the presence of a mitigation
effect would be reflected by a negative coefficient of the interaction term. Nevertheless, in
this latter approach, it is not straightforward to identify the exact size of the mitigation
effect.
A final point that we can take into consideration is the issue of cross-sectional het-
eroscedasticity. The economic structures of Canadian provinces are very heterogeneous.
The economies of Quebec and Ontario are much more diversified than those of the other
provinces (see Beine and Coulombe, 2003), thanks to a well-diversified manufacturing
base. The Western provinces and Newfoundland are more dependent on natural resources.
The growth pattern of larger provinces is more stable than that of less-diversified provinces
such as Saskatchewan and Newfoundland. Furthermore, oil extraction is concentrated
(though not exclusively) in Alberta and Newfoundland.
We use the best empirical methodology, given the small number of cross sections
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(10). For the first set of results, we use pooled least-squares (PLS) and we rely on
generalized least-squares (FGLS) estimations using cross-sectional weighted regressions.
The second set of results comes from PLS with cross-section weighted standard errors
(PCSE) that allow for asymptotically valid inferences in the presence of cross-sectional
heteroscedasticity.
4 Data
In order to proxy the key variables of equation (9), we use data from three different
sources: (i) Statistics Canada’s special tabulations for all aggregate and sectoral GDP
and employment data, (ii) Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s data for temporary
and permanent international immigration, and (iii) Statistics Canada’s CANSIM data for
interprovincial migrations (available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/).
4.1 Measuring output, employment and productivity
The data on aggregate, provincial, and sectoral (manufacturing, service, and natural
resource) output (value-added), productivity, employment, and prices were tabulated at
our request by the Income and Expenditure Accounts Division of Statistics Canada. Those
data allow us to find proxies for ni,t, mlpi,t, slpi,t, Ri,t and TTi,t. The tradable sector
corresponds to the manufacturing sector, while the non-tradable sector is proxied by
services.17 Services include government services. We obtain ni,t by taking the ratio of
provincial service employment over the provincial labour force.
The booming sector refers to NAICS 21 (mining, quarrying and oil well industries).
Resource income, Ri,t, is calculated as (nominal) GDP in NAICS 21, divided by nominal
GDP of all industries in each province. GDP data are in nominal and chained (2002)
GDP dollars, and employment is measured in hours worked. We did not have access to
reliable data on the capital stock. Consequently, we use a labour productivity concept
(rather than multifactor productivity) to measure mlpi,t and slpi,t. Terms of trade at the
17Acosta et al. (2009) use the same proxies. Harding and Venables (2013) use components of the
balance of payments, such as non-resource gross and net exports.
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provincial level (TTi,t) are obtained by subtracting the growth of real provincial GDP from
the growth of real provincial income. The latter was measured as the ratio of provincial
nominal GDP divided by the national CPI (CANSIM Table 326-0021). Data are available
on an annual basis from 1984 to 2007.
4.2 Migration
Data on permanent and temporary immigrants were obtained from Citizenship and Im-
migration Canada (CIC, 2010). Data are available on an annual basis from 1985 to 2009,
by province, for various classes of immigrants.
“Temporary immigrants” refer to migrants under the temporary foreign worker (TFW)
programs. Every year, the inflow of temporary immigrants is considered an addition to the
provincial labour force. The TFW program is administered by the federal government.
The programs implement migration schemes meant to provide solutions to temporary
shortages in occupational labour taking into account the local stance of the labour market.
In addition, the Canadian government targets additional benefits such as the creation of
new job opportunities or the preservation of jobs for Canadian workers. The temporary
immigrants are subject to a labour market test taking the form of a Labour Market
Opinion that the employer must obtain from the Canadian authorities. The rationale
for the Labour Market Opinion test is to avoid substitution effects between local natives
and the temporary foreign workers. The rights associated to those particular visas are
in general less generous compared to permanent immigrants (see for details Gross and
Schmitt (2012)). Under these programs, foreign workers are entitled to work for about
one year, with a possibility of renewal, with renewal depending on the rate of vacant
occupations. As a result, these temporary inflows can be considered highly responsive to
labour market conditions, which does not imply in any way that it is specifically used for
industrial policies.
For the permanent immigration component, we consider only economic immigrants
because these are obviously a direct addition to the labour force. We leave aside other
permanent migrants such as those belonging to the refugee class or those coming under
19
family reunification. Permanent economic migrants are selected under the point system
in Canada. This system allocates points based on a screening of personal characteristics
(age, education, language proficiency), which in turn determines whether they obtain a
visa. Furthermore, as shown by Coulombe and Tremblay (2009), a large proportion of per-
manent immigrants tend to concentrate in big cities - Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver
- where the presence of a large diaspora decreases the cost of immigration and integra-
tion. Nevertheless, there are fewer guarantees that their skills will match those needed
in the sectors facing labour shortages. For the period under study, one might therefore
consider permanent migration flows to be much less driven by market conditions than the
temporary migrant flows.
Data on interprovincial migration were extracted from the Statistics Canada CANSIM
website (Tables 051-0012). These rich and unique regional data are derived from the resi-
dence information on income tax returns that Canadians have to fill out every year. Data
are available both as net flows for the 10 provinces and as in- and out-migration flows
to and from each province. We use data for the 15-to-64 age group. Data on flows are
available on a yearly basis from 1971 to 2009. Unlike international migration, interprovin-
cial migration is unrestricted. It is meant to respond quite quickly to relative economic
conditions in the Canadian regions. However, social security and unemployment benefits
may dampen the responsiveness of internal migration to relative shocks. Furthermore,
interprovincial immigrants do not migrate solely for labour market reasons. As demon-
strated by Coulombe (2006), a large part of interprovincial migration flows are spouses
with children and the return migration of older people who come back to their original
province to retire.
Therefore, the final aggregate impact of that type of labour inflow remains uncertain.
All three categories of migration are taken as a ratio over the (provincial) labour force
(CANSIM Table 282-0055, available from 1987 to 2009).
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4.3 Evolution 1987-2009
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the key variables over the inspection period (1987-2009).
First, with respect to resource booms, Panel (1) makes it clear that Canadian regions did
not all experience a global resource boom. Three provinces benefited from a huge increase
in resource income: Alberta (mainly oil revenues), Newfoundland (oil), and Saskatchewan
(potash, minerals, and oil and gas). The surge was more recent for Newfoundland com-
pared with the other two provinces. For the other seven provinces, the resource income
is less important, at least in relative terms.
Regarding labour mobility, the provinces also experienced quite heterogeneous situ-
ations. Regarding net interprovincial migration (panels 2 to 4), some provinces such as
Alberta have been systematic net receivers in terms of labour. In contrast, for most of the
investigation period, Newfoundland experienced net outflows, with a significant number
of workers going to Alberta.18 Nevertheless, with the oil boom in Newfoundland, labour
losses have decreased since 1998 and even turned into net inflows at the end of the period.
Panel 5 displays the number of immigrants in each province coming under the tempo-
rary foreign worker program. It shows that the program was used differently across the
provinces. In particular, provinces like British Columbia, Ontario, and Alberta received
foreign workers as early as in 1985 and relied increasingly on temporary migrants to match
labour market needs. In other provinces, the program became a non-negligible source of
variation in the labour force only at the end of the 1990s. The inflows of economic mi-
grants coming under the permanent immigration schemes (Panel 6) also benefited the
Canadian provinces. Interestingly, the cross-sectional correlation between permanent and
temporary immigration is far from perfect. For instance, some provinces such as Prince
Edward Island or, to a lesser extent, Manitoba relied heavily on permanent immigration
rather than on temporary worker programs.
18Between 2004 and 2006, net interprovincial migration to Alberta accounted for an increase of 114,000,
or 3.3 per cent, in Alberta’s population. At the peak of the oil boom in 2006, weekly flights were estab-
lished between Fort McMurray in northern Alberta at the heart of the Athabasca region and St. John’s,
Newfoundland.
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Figure 1: Migration and Windfall
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5 Results
To assess the existence and amplitude of a potential mitigation effect of immigration
on the Dutch disease, we proceed in different steps. First, we look at the role of total
immigration and test for a mitigation effect in two different ways: (i) as a direct effect on
the industrial structure, and (ii) through the inclusion of an interaction term between the
resource boom and the immigration flows. Second, we disaggregate migration flows into
three components, examining the respective role of each type of labour mobility. We then
further deconstruct interprovincial migration into inflows and outflows. Finally, in a set
of robustness checks, we relax the initial assumptions such as exogeneity of immigration
and absence of any other important source of variation in the labour supply.19
5.1 Total immigration
5.1.1 Benchmark regressions
In Table 1, we test for a mitigation effect through the inclusion of total immigration in
equation (9). In columns (1) to (2), we omit immigration in the set of explanatory vari-
ables. (It is included in the subsequent columns.) We use total migration flows in columns
(3) and (5) that are, for each province, the sum of temporary and permanent immigration
flows plus net interprovincial immigration. In columns (4) and (6), we subtract permanent
migrants from total immigration flows since permanent migrants are expected to respond
less to labour market conditions in the provinces. Each specification is estimated using
FGLS and PLS.
Interestingly, the estimates of the parameters are all in line with the theoretical equi-
librium condition (see equation (7)). Changes in productivities in the two sectors emerge
with the expected sign. We also get a negative impact for the terms of trade, which is in
line with the restrictions on structural parameters in equation (7).
The point estimates of ξ, which capture the catching-up process of the industrial
structure, lie around -0.2 and are highly significant, suggesting a stable adjustment pro-
19An online appendix available on the website of the Journal contains all the data and the codes needed
to replicate all the results. The econometric codes are in Stata and Eviews.
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Table 1: Mitigation effect of total immigration: direct effect
Dependent variable: change in share of N sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimation Method (FGLS) (PLS) (FGLS) (FGLS) (PLS) (PLS) (FGLS)
Lagged dependent −0.197∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗
(5.099) (4.603) (6.077) (6.310) (4.930) (4.965) (6.320)
Change in T sector prod 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(4.089) (3.322) (4.526) (4.519) (3.621) (3.622) (4.490)
Change in N sector prod −0.119∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(4.696) (3.838) (4.097) (4.044) (3.430) (3.407) 3.380
Resource 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(2.249) (1.985) (3.309) (3.533) (2.613) (2.723) (2.470)
Terms of trade −0.044∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(3.840) (2.760) (4.712) (4.808) (3.259) (3.307) (3.880)
Total immigration - - −0.217∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗ −0.186∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(3.235) (3.733) (2.176) (2.437) (3.400)
R2 0.518 0.449 0.552 0.560 0.468 0.472 0.488
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Time Span ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07
Notes: Year and Province fixed effects always included.
Panel Corrected Standard Errors calculated. FGLS: cross-section weights used.
Columns (3) and (5): total immigration: net interprovincial migration, temporary and permanent immigrants.
Columns (4) and (6): total immigration equals net interprovincial migration and temporary immigrants.
Columns (7): change in R rather than level of R used to capture resource windfall.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
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cess across the different specifications. This number implies that, after a shock, the
provincial economic structure takes approximately 3.5 years on average to make half of
the adjustment.
All in all, the data fit with the equilibrium condition derived from the theoretical
model. The estimated value of the coefficient relative to the resource variable, Ri,t, is
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level when the migration variable is introduced.
The windfall’s impact on the size of the non-tradable sector supports a Dutch disease
phenomenon. This result concurs with previous findings obtained by Acosta et al. (2009)
and Harding and Venables (2013). This result is robust to the measurement of the resource
windfall. In column (7), we use the year-to-year change in Ri,t rather than the level of Ri,t,
which is the measure used most often (if not the only measure) in the existing literature.20
Results for both measures are extremely similar.
In columns (1) and (2), when immigration flows are not included as controls, the effect
of Ri,t is still positive and significant at the 5 per cent level. However, the estimator is
negatively biased due to the omission of the immigration flow that, first, tends to exert
some mitigation effect and second, is correlated with the windfall (the so-called Alberta
effect). This mitigation effect is further confirmed by the direct estimates of the impact
of migi,t associated with total immigration in columns (3) to (6). The point estimates
of the migration variable are all negative and significant at the 5 per cent level at least.
From an economic point of view, the coefficient of R estimated in columns (1) and (2)
is the net effect of Dutch disease, i.e., the spending effect (plus eventually the resource
movement effect if any), less the mitigation effect exerted by immigration.
Dropping permanent immigration not only alters the results (columns [4] and [6] versus
[3] and [5]) but also leads to an increase in the point estimate of the resource windfall and
improves the fit of the data as reflected by the R2. This results in a higher mitigation
effect when immigration is defined only as the sum of interprovincial flows and temporary
inflows, excluding permanent migrants. This implies a stronger role for those migration
20The share of the income generated by the resource sector is a usual measure in the literature, see for
instance Sachs and Warner (2001), Acosta et al. (2009), or Harding and Venables (2013) among others.
However, one can argue that, at the steady state, a constant level of R will not lead to a change in ni,t
and that the change in the resource windfall rather than its level should be used in the regression analysis.
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flows in terms of mitigation, compared with international permanent immigration flow.
This conjecture will be further explored in the next subsection.
5.1.2 Interaction between migration and resource income
Table 2 looks at the mitigation effect through the interaction between the resource inflow,
R, and total immigration, mig. In that set-up, the mitigation effect is supposed to
be higher for booming provinces. The estimates of Table 2 support that view. Once
again, the coefficient of R increases when the interaction term is included, suggesting that
immigration plays a role in the adjustment of the economy to the boom. The estimates
of the coefficient relative to the interaction term support the view that immigration can
mitigate Dutch disease. It also confirms that this effect increases with the size of the
resource boom. As in Table 1, the impact is higher when permanent migrants are not
included in total immigration flows.21 For both Tables 1 and 2, the effect of migration
flows appears to be estimated less accurately with PLS than with FGLS for all models.
However, the mitigation effect remains significant under both estimation strategies.
5.2 Types of migration flows
Table 3 gives the estimates of equation (7), when migration inflows are broken down
by categories: net interprovincial immigration, temporary immigration, and permanent
immigration. In column (3), the mitigation effect is captured with interaction terms in-
volving the resource inflow. As previously explained in Section 4.2, those flows involve
different types of migrants that differ in their sensitivities to labour market imbalances.
Indeed, the policy objective of the temporary foreign worker programs is to supply work-
ers in sectors in which there is an obvious shortage of labour. These immigrants can thus
be viewed as a true addition to the provincial labour force. The same can be said about
interprovincial migration, as illustrated by the migration of Ontario workers to Alberta in
2005. These migration flows appear to be motivated by labour market conditions. How-
21A t-test on the difference of the mean of the estimated coefficients on resource rejects the null of no
difference for both specifications.
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Table 2: Mitigation effect of immigration: interaction terms
Dependent variable: change in share of N sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation Method (FGLS) (PLS) (FGLS) (FGLS) (PLS) (PLS)
Lagged dependent −0.197∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗
(5.099) (4.603) (5.500) (5.532) (4.729) (4.748)
Change in T sector prod 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(4.089) (3.322) (4.379) (4.383) (3.522) (3.525)
Change in N sector prod −0.119∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
(4.696) (3.838) (3.705) (3.707) (3.062) (3.070)
Resource 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(2.249) (1.985) (3.079) (3.095) (2.334) (2.334)
Terms of trade −0.044∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗
(3.840) (2.760) (4.209) (4.278) (3.047) (3.092)
Total immigration × Resource − − −0.611∗∗∗ −0.675∗∗∗ −0.556∗∗ −0.610∗∗
(2.590) (2.659) (2.122) (2.153)
R2 0.518 0.449 0.539 0.540 0.465 0.465
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
Time Span ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07
Notes: Year and Province fixed effects always included.
Panel Corrected Standard Errors calculated. FGLS: cross-section weights used.
Columns (3) and (5): total immigration: net interprovincial migration as well as temporary and permanent immigrants.
Columns (4) and (6): total immigration equals net interprovincial migration and temporary immigrants.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
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ever, since not all interprovincial migrants are workers, nor are driven solely by economic
motives (Coulombe, 2006), the associated elasticity of the interprovincial immigration is
expected to be lower than that for temporary migrants. Finally, the selection procedure
and the motivation for permanent migrants do not directly relate to booming sectors of
some provinces.
The results obtained in Table 3 are consistent with the fact that market sensitivity is a
key determinant of the mitigation effect. First, in contrast with the other migration flows,
permanent migrants flows do not yield a significant mitigation effect. In columns (1) to
(3), the key finding is that the point estimate of the permanent component of migration is
never significant. It is also in line with the previous results obtained with total migration,
including or excluding permanent economic migration. In all columns of Table 3, the
point estimates of the other two components have the expected negative sign and are
significant at least at the 5 percent level. Second, the respective elasticities of temporary
and interprovincial migration are also consistent with the key role of market sensitivities:
the point estimate of the impact of temporary migrants is on average twice as much as
that associated with net interprovincial migration. In all, the results support the view
that the mitigation effect is associated with migration flows that are more market driven.
Columns (2) and (5) break down net interprovincial migration further into emigration
and immigration. Interestingly, the associated coefficients of emigration and immigration
are almost identical (with opposite signs, of course). They suggest that changes in the
labour supply affect the share of the tradable and non-tradable sectors in the way pre-
dicted by the model. Also, an important implication of that result is that interprovincial
emigration can act as an important channel to spread the effects of Dutch disease between
provinces: one worker migrating from a non-booming province (say Ontario) to a boom-
ing province (say Alberta) will not only mitigate the Dutch disease in the latter province
but also propagate the effect in the former. As emphasized in Section 2.3, interprovincial
emigration operates like a resource movement effect. This does not mean that the resource
windfall spreads to the other provinces through this channel but rather through the loss
of labour in favour of the booming province.
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Table 3: Mitigation effect of total immigration: types of migration flows
Dependent variable: change in share of N sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation Method (FGLS) (FGLS) (FGLS) (FGLS) (FGLS)
Mitigation effect (Direct) (Direct) (Interaction) (Direct) (Direct)
Lagged dependent −0.259∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗
(6.280) (6.251) (5.820) (6.436) (6.387)
Change in T sector prod 0.029∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(4.494) (4.391) (4.136) (4.599) (4.472)
Change in N sector prod −0.101∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(4.072) (4.038) (3.853) (4.082) (4.046)
Resource 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(3.542) (3.525) (3.729) (3.540) (3.529)
Terms of trade −0.052∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
(4.414) (4.391) (3.893) (4.470) (4.448)
Net interprovincial immigration −0.234∗∗∗ - −0.824∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ -
(3.526) (2.192) (3.629)
Interprovincial immigration - −0.240∗∗ - - −0.252∗∗
(2.068) (2.191)
Interprovincial emigration - 0.240∗∗ - - 0.239∗∗
(2.028) (2.025)
Temporary immigration −0.450∗∗ −0.450∗∗ −2.995∗∗∗ −0.475∗∗ −0.477∗∗
(2.114) (2.084) (3.250) (2.275) (2.257)
Permanent immigration 0.129 0.125 5.982 - -
(0.613) (0.594) (1.603)
R2 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.565
Observations 210 210 210 210 210
Time Span ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07
Notes: Year and Province fixed effects always included. FGLS: cross-section weights used.
Column (3): migration variables are interacted with resource income.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05.
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5.3 Robustness
5.3.1 Endogeneity issues
Up to now, the estimation of equation (9) has assumed that all right-hand-side
variables are exogenous. This is consistent with the underlying theory. Nevertheless,
in practice, it might be desirable to assess whether our estimation results are robust when
accounting for endogeneity issues. We address four specific sources of endogeneity. We
first address concerns of possible correlation of our measure of the windfall with the error
term. Second, we look at whether the omission of alternative sources in the labour supply
such as the variation in domestic participation rates drives our results. Third, we look
at possible endogeneity of migration flows. Finally, we check whether our estimates are
robust to additional sources of endogeneity and misspecification through GMM estimation
and testing.
Instrumentation of the windfall.
The first channel of endogeneity is related to our specific measure of the windfall R as
well as to the measure of the industrial structure (n) in equation (7). Indeed, dropping the
i subscript, R is measured as the ratio of the windfall associated to the natural resources
to provincial GDP, which in turn is the sum of production in the N and in the T sector
of province plus the production of the resource sectors. A shock to the N sector in some
provinces (suppose for instance provincial government services are reduced) will jointly
affect our measures of n and R, creating some correlation between R and the error term.
This could in turn affect our estimation of the Dutch disease, as well as the impact of the
other variables.
The solution to that econometric issue is to instrument R with some variable exogenous
with respect to n. We follow this route by using indexes of the variation of R associated
to the evolution of world commodity prices for the relevant commodities in each province.
The world prices of oil, potash, natural gaz or wood are set on the international financial
markets and are obviously unrelated to the industrial structure of the Canadian provinces.
Canada is a small open economy, and each of its provinces is even smaller with no expected
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influence on the international price of their produced commodities. In contrast, a rise in
the world price of commodities generates a significant change in R in commodity-rich
provinces, as exemplified by the oil boom in Alberta over the 2002-2007 period. It is
expected that the variability of R associated to shocks to the world commodity prices is
far more important than the variation due to shocks to YN or to YT . Instrumenting R
with world commodity prices allows us to check that our line of reasoning is correct.
More precisely, for each commodity-producing province we build the following instru-
ment. For each province, we compute the product of the share of the main commodity in
the provincial GDP and its world price index provided the production of this commod-
ity represents a significant share in provincial output.22 For some provinces like British
Colombia or Alberta which are rich in more than one commodity, we also generate a
second instrument involving the second commodity, following the same computation. In
order to reflect resource endowments and to avoid changes in weights due to production
shifts driven by price changes, we fix the weights to their value in the middle of the
investigation period, namely in 1997.23
Table 4 presents the estimation results instrumenting R. Columns (1) and (3) report
the results obtain with one instrument, while columns (2) and (4) provide the findings
obtained with two instruments. Columns (1) and (2) give the results for the mitigation
effect of aggregate immigration, while columns (3) and (4) consider the impact of immi-
gration broken down by type of flows. Basically, the estimation results of Table 4 show
that our findings are robust to the possible endogeneity of R. The estimated coefficients
are in line with the benchmark regression, for both cases in terms of the number of in-
struments. In particular, the estimation of the Dutch disease effect of the windfall is in
line with previous findings. The mitigation effects are also quite similar with respect to
previous estimates.
22Basically, the resource-rich provinces are British Columbia (Wood and Gaz), Alberta (Oil and Gaz),
Saskatchewan (Potash) and New Foundland (Oil after 1997).
23The commodity price indices are drawn from the IMF database of primary commodity prices. They
are expressed in USD (see www.imf.org/np/res/commod/index.asp). The data used to compute the
provincial weights of each commodity comes from Statistics Canada (CANSIM 381-005). Note also that
the breakdown by sector at the provincial level is not available for all years. The share of some sectors
like Potash is not always reported for the sake of statistical secrecy and is included in the broad mining
category.
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Table 4: Mitigation effect of total immigration: Instrumentation of the windfall.
Dependent variable: change in share of N sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent −.225∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗
(5.434) (5.324) (5.347) (5.235)
Change in T sector prod 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(4.260) (4.466) (4.153) (4.340)
Change in N sector prod −0.100∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(3.629) (3.520) (3.717) (3.606)
Resource 0.031∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(2.613) (2.511) (2.778) (2.622)
Terms of trade −0.043∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(3.134) (3.117) (3.036) (2.994)
Total immigration −0.173∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗ - -
(2.579) (2.294)
Net interprovincial immigration - - −0.156∗∗ −0.129∗
(2.087) (1.693)
Temporary immigration - - −0.473∗ −0.449∗
(1.751) (1.649)
Permanent immigration - - 0.035 0.046
(0.119) (0.157)
R2 0.501 0.516 0.479 0.490
Observations 206 202 206 202
# Instruments 1 2 1 2
F-stat First stage 227.18 127.20 222.97 123.15
Overid Test (p-value) - 0.353 - 0.243
Notes: Year and Province fixed effects always included. Cross-section weights used for standard errors.
Columns (1) and (3): instrument of R: share of main commodity in provincial GDP.
Columns (2) and (4): instruments of R: shares of two first commodities in provincial GDP .
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel IV regressions. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Omission of other labour supply factors.
So far, we have considered immigration as the only important source of the variation
of the provincial labour supply and the only mitigation mechanism of Dutch disease. One
potential issue in the estimation of equation (9) is the omission of some additional factors
influencing the provincial labour supply that are correlated with aggregate immigration.
The recent literature emphasizes that the aggregate labour supply of natives is not inelas-
tic with respect to wages (Keane, 2011; Chetty, 2012; Blundell et al., 2011). If commodity
booms tend to increase wages, this might in turn increase participations rates of native
workers, much like for immigration flows. The key issue is therefore whether the mitiga-
tion effect associated to immigration survives when other sources of variation of labour
supply such as participation rates are accounted for.
To tackle this issue, we augment model (9) and include participation rates observed
in each province over the whole period.24 In order to get some insight on the role of the
native labour supply on the mitigation effect of immigration, we estimate model (9) with
aggregate immigration and labour participation rates jointly included as well as included
separately. The results are provided in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. We also regress
participation rates on the other covariates of model to gain some understanding of its
main drivers. Those results are included in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.
Three comments are in order here. First and importantly, it should be emphasized
that the introduction of participation rates in this model does not take place without
some econometric concerns. The reason is that by construction, participation rates will
be correlated with our dependent variable since they include employment rates. This
in turn means that in contrast with immigration rates, the introduction of participation
rates induces some endogeneity issue due to the way the variables are measured. In turn,
this means that the results obtained for participation rates with FGLS should be taken
with some caution.25
24The participation rates come directly from the CANSIM database (Table 282-0002) and are computed
as the ratio of the labour force (age 15-64 years) over the total population (age 15-64 years) for both
sexes. Note that they capture only the extensive margin of the labour supply
25Of course, one possibility would be to instrument participation rates. Nevertheless, finding instru-
ments that vary across provinces and over time is obviously cumbersome and is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Table 5: Mitigation effect of total immigration: accounting for participation rates.
Dependent variable:
change in participation rates change in share of N sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lag dependent - - −0.240∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
(6.094) (5.270)
Change in T sector prod −1.306∗∗∗ −1.059∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(2.650) (1.913) (4.006) (3.479)
Change in N sector prod −5.386∗∗ −3.931 −0.113∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(2.751) (1.649) (4.570) (5.304)
Resource −1.515∗ −.257 0.032∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(1.954) (0.321) (3.148) (2.276)
Terms of trade 1.403 0.671 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(1.600) (0.730) (4.405) (3.712)
Total immigration 22.489∗∗∗ - −0.174∗∗∗ -
(4.300) (2.776)
Participation rates - - −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(4.051) (2.812)
R2 0.548 0.528 0.575 0.549
Observations 210 210 210 210
Notes: Year and Province fixed effects always included. Cross-section weights used for standard errors.
Columns (1) and (2) : dependent variable: change in participation rates.
Columns (3) and (4) : dependent variable: change in share of N sector.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Second, looking at columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, there is little evidence that changes
in provincial participation rates are directly and contemporaneously related to resource
windfalls. Regressions of participation rates on R (or the change in R) deliver either
an insignificant effect or an unintuitive negative effect. A couple of examples can help
understanding this finding. While there is a clear response of participation rates to re-
source booms in some cases (such as the 1973 first oil shock in Alberta, and the 1997 oil
shock in Newfoundland following the start of the production at Hibernia), the impact is
not observed for all episodes. For instance, participation rates only slightly increased in
Alberta in 2001, one of the reasons being that Alberta’s participation rate was already
close to the upper bound. The participation rate in Alberta is by far the highest one
(73.7% vs 66.8% for Canada as a whole in 2011). Second, there are other important
drivers of participation rates than resource windfalls. In Newfoundland, the collapse of
cod fishing in 1992 led to a dramatic decrease of participation rates (going from 56.8%
to 52.5% between 1990 and 1996). The subsequent increase of participation due to the
exploitation of off-shore platforms drove back the level slightly over the initial value of
1990. Nevertheless, even after 15 years of oil production, Newfoundland still exhibits by
far the lowest participation rate among all Canadian provinces (60.2% in 2011). To sum
up, in the Canadian case, over the recent period of time, it is unclear to what extent
resource windfalls are associated in the short run to significant increases in participation
rates of native workers. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between participation
rates and immigration flows.
Third, the fact that provincial participation rates are not contemporaneously corre-
lated to resource windfalls whereas they are positively correlated with immigration flows
are useful to understand the regression results with the augmented model (columns [3]
and [4] of Table 5). First, the introduction of participation rates obviously leads to a
decrease in the share of the non-tradable sector, an effect which is comparable to the one
obtained with immigration. This confirms that the negative effect previously identified
goes through a change in the labour supply. Due to the positive correlation between
participation rates and immigration, the negative impact of immigration is attenuated
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by about 20%. The negative effect of aggregate immigration remains nevertheless very
robust in terms of statistical significance. Nevertheless, interestingly, when participation
rates are introduced without immigration, we do not find a mitigation effect of the kind
previously documented for immigration. Compared to a specification without participa-
tion rates and immigration (see Table 1), the coefficient of the windfall stays indeed fairly
constant (0.023 vs 0.022). Therefore, since participation rates seem to be uncorrelated
with the windfall we conclude that it should not be considered as a mitigating factor in
the same sense as migration is.
Endogeneity of immigration
An important issue regarding the estimation of equation (9) is the possible endogene-
ity of immigration flows. To start with, it is important to understand the exact nature of
endogeneity that could arise as well as how the three types of immigration flows are likely
to be affected by endogeneity issues. A fundamental distinction in this respect is whether
immigration flows are regulated, as in the case of international immigration or, unreg-
ulated, as interprovincial mobility of Canadian workers. As explained below, potential
endogeneity of regulated immigration flows indeed boils down to potential endogeneity of
immigration policies governing those flows.
Endogeneity of interprovincial immigration.
For interprovincial migrants, the endogeneity of immigration flows will arise if those
migrants tend to move to a particular province as a response of a change in the industrial
structure of that province or if those flows are correlated with some unobserved factors
affecting the industrial structure. It is definitely a concern here. For instance, since
interprovincial migrants include all Canadians, it could be that civil servants will move
to a province in which some public services are opened or expanded. Another example is
the flow of construction workers from other provinces that could be triggered in provinces
that expand their infrastructure.
On the other hand, it is unclear whether this endogeneity problem is important from
a quantitative point of view and hence, whether the estimation bias will be large. Inter-
provincial migration in Canada has been shown not to be driven by short-term changes
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in the industrial structure. As shown by Coulombe (2006), those flows are driven more
by long-run bilateral factors such as urban-rural differences, long-run differentials in un-
employment, or productivity differentials. Most of those long-run factors are picked up
by the provincial fixed effects λi in model (9).
To account for this potential channel of endogeneity, we estimate model (9) by instru-
menting either interprovincial net migration or total immigration. We instrument those
variables using lagged immigration flows of international permanent and temporary mi-
grants. The idea is quite intuitive. Job opportunities and job vacancies tend to decrease
as a result of inflows of international migrants. Therefore, provinces that have previously
received relatively more international migrants tend to be less attractive to interprovin-
cial migrants. In other terms, there is some substitution over time between international
migrants and interprovincial migrants. Since the process of filling jobs takes time, this
substitution shows up only after a while.
The underlying assumption of the exclusion restriction in this IV strategy is that
past immigration flows of international migrants two years before are not related to the
contemporaneous change of the industrial structure. It assumes that interprovincial mi-
grants do not form expectations about the future changes in industrial structure beyond
a two-year horizon. Additionally, the mechanism of replacement of job opportunities is
not specifically related to the industrial structure, but to the general development of the
particular problem which is controlled for by the other covariates and the included fixed
effects.
Our first-stage regression results are fully consistent with this story. Net interprovincial
immigration tends to be negatively affected by two-period lagged international permanent
and temporary migrants. Although the F-stats are under the traditional cut-off value of
10, both coefficients are negatively significant at a 1 per cent level in the first-stage. Fur-
thermore, the over-identification test supports the validity of the exclusion hypothesis.
The same holds for total immigration, albeit less obviously. This is not surprising, given
that total immigration includes international immigration that can be considered as ex-
ogenous. Furthermore, while past international migration is negatively correlated with
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contemporaneous net interprovincial migration, the same does not hold for contempora-
neous international immigration.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table 6 report the estimation results of equation (9) with
instrumental variables. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for total immigration while
columns (3) and (4) give the results, broken down by type of immigration flow. The main
results are fully in line with the benchmark regressions. First, total immigration exerts a
negative effect on the share of the N sector. Second, we find some mitigation effect for net
interprovincial migration as well as temporary international immigration. Furthermore,
the amplitudes of the estimated elasticities are in the same range of those estimated in
the benchmark regressions. This suggests that our results are not fundamentally driven
by the possible endogeneity of interprovincial migration.
Endogeneity of international immigration.
The case for endogeneity for international migration is different. International immi-
gration, both of temporary and permanent types, is regulated by the Canadian authorities.
With a practically infinite supply of international migrants for the Canadian provinces,
the number of immigrants is determined by immigration policies. Therefore, the case
for endogeneity of those flows boils down to checking whether immigration policies in
Canada are endogenous with respect to the industrial structure and then what are its
possible determinants. As a useful guide for the discussion about endogeneity, we can
define the conditions under which endogeneity of international migration flows can be ex-
pected. Three basic conditions are required here. First, the magnitude of the immigrant
inflows should depend on the provincial variation in the industrial structure. This implies
that either the federal government is in charge of the immigration policy but takes ex-
plicitly provincial circumstances into consideration or that provinces are in charge of the
determination of the provincial inflows. Second, given that our variable of interest is the
industrial structure, for any endogeneity bias to materialize, the immigration authorities
should favour one particular sector, i.e. either the NT sector or the T sector. Third, this
policy bias should apply to a significant number of provinces and for a significant period
of time. In other terms, the policy bias should be systematic enough. The evaluation
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of these conditions is likely to differ between permanent immigration and the temporary
foreign worker program and is discussed therefore separately below.
Regarding the permanent component of international immigrant, Green and Green
(2004) offer a good overview of the immigration policies over quite a long period (1870-
2004) and they show that immigration policy is clearly endogenous with respect to the
economic cycle. For our investigation period, they make clear that one of the main
objectives of the Canadian immigration policy has been the so-called absorptive capacity,
or in other terms the fact that the immigration flows were adjusted with respect to the
aggregate business cycle.
There is no clear-cut evidence that governments, in the way international permanent
migrants are selected, systematically favoured one particular sector in a given province.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that some particular occupations are sporadically favoured.26
Ministerial instructions have been introduced in the point system in order to favour some
specific occupations.27 Still it is unclear that one broad sector has been systematically
boosted.28 Furthermore, these occupations were introduced explicitly in 2008, i.e. after
our investigation period. In short, while we cannot rule out completely any endogene-
ity bias for permanent immigration, the magnitude of the bias is subject to discussion.
The instrumentation of total immigration takes partly care of this remaining concern (see
columns (1) and (2) in Table 6).
Green and Green (2004) do not cover explicitly the temporary foreign worker programs
that were implemented at the end of the nineties.29 Given the recent implementation of
those programs and the sensitivity of some policy issues, information about the exact
design and goals of the policies regarding temporary foreign workers is not always clear.
For instance, although the federal authorities administer the program and are responsible
26For instance, Quebec favoured in 2010 and after some particular occupations such as specialised
engineers to work in the aeronautic and railway industry.
27See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/mi/)
28Continuing with the example of Quebec, the Ministerial Instructions favoured some specific occupa-
tions both from the traded sector (e.g. heavy-duty Equipment Mechanics, industrial electricians) and
the non-traded sector (e.g. medical occupations, educational jobs, waiters). See Canada Gazette, Vol.
144, No. 26 ? 26 June 2010 available at http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2010/2010-06-26/html/notice-
avis-eng.html, for more details.
29See nevertheless Gross and Schmitt (2012) or Nakche and Kinoshita (2010) for descriptions.
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for permits and visas, labour market opinions take local provincial circumstances into
account and immigration policies are discussed with the provinces (as well as other stake-
holders such as employers). This has led to legal agreements between most provinces and
the federal authorities that aim to give the provincial authorities a larger say in the selec-
tion of migrants to their provinces. These agreements cover variably both the permanent
economic migration as well as the temporary foreign worker program.30 For the sake of
discussing the endogeneity nature of the temporary migrants, it is important to note that
these agreements have come into operation after the end of our investigation period.
The main aim for the temporary foreign worker program is “to address labour market
shortages and to provide other economic opportunities for Canadians, such as job creation
and the transfer of new skills and knowledge.”31 The list of vacant jobs to be filled
by the temporary foreign workers include professional occupations that fall both in the
aggregate non-tradable sector and the aggregate tradable sector.32 This suggests that
there is no systematic bias of the temporary foreign worker programs in favour of one
particular sector. One could nevertheless argue that the number of vacant positions
opened to temporary foreign workers could be biased in favour of one particular sector.
For instance, one could imagine that immigration authorities are concerned by the Dutch
disease phenomenon and tend to open proportionally more positions belonging to the
tradable sector in order to counteract an increase in the non tradable sector.33
In order to check for this possibility, we constructed the ratio between the two sectors
(non-tradable and tradable) of the number of temporary foreign worker positions on labour
market opinion confirmations in each province over the period 2005-2008.34 This ratio
30In particular, these annexes organise the use of provincial nominee programs that allow provinces to
issue permanent visas to a subset of foreign workers. See http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-
policy/agreements/index.asp. Regarding the specific case of the management of temporary foreign work-
ers, four provinces have signed an agreement with the federal government (CIC): Alberta in 2009; British
Columbia in 2009; Ontario in 2008 and Nova Scotia in 2007.
31http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/paa/2013/activity-12.asp [accessed 7 June 2013]
32For instance, over the period 2005-2008, the list of occupations subject to labour market opinion
tests included jobs in the manufacturing sector such as engineers and technicians, jobs in the resource
sector such as miners or drillers as well as jobs in the non tradable sector such as teachers, health care
workers or waiters.
33Green and Green (2004) argue that this would be an ineffective or inefficient policy to start with.
34Obtained from Human Resources and Human Development Canada, Labour Market Opinion Statis-
tics, 2005-2008. These numbers therefore capture the desired temporary foreign workers for each province
and for each sector by the Canadian authorities. Of course these do not necessarily correspond to the
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of vacancy allocation over sectors should give an idea of the relative preference of the
authorities for both sectors. We regress this ratio on the ratio of the number of jobs in
each sector, i.e. our dependent variable in level of model (7). We include provincial fixed
effects. A systematic bias should suggest a negative and significant coefficient. We use
different specifications, using lagged or contemporary values of the explanatory variable,
including or not time fixed effects. No specification produces any significant coefficient,
suggesting that there is little evidence for a systematic bias.35 In turn, this suggests that
over that period, the degree of endogeneity of the immigration policy regarding temporary
foreign workers was quite limited.
Finally, the above mentioned indirect evidence was derived from data collected over
a limited period of time. As governments change, policy goals and implementation of
immigration policies are likely to evolve over time. Therefore, in order to deal with
possible remaining endogeneity, we also conduct a more direct approach and instrument
temporary international immigration following a two-step approach. This approach makes
use of bilateral data on temporary foreign workers.36 In the first step, we use bilateral
annual flows of temporary workers from each origin country of the world to each Canadian
province.37 We estimate a usual gravity model in double-log form regressing the (log of
the) bilateral annual flow on exogenous covariates and a set of fixed effects. The covariates
involve (the log of) the bilateral distance between the country of origin and the provincial
capital, two bilateral dummies capturing whether the country of origin and the province
share either English or French as an official or commonly used language. We also include
origin fixed effects, provincial destination fixed effect and destination-time fixed effects.
actual number of TFW since some of these positions are not filled due to an insufficient number of ap-
plications or failure by candidates to obtain a visa. The time availability only overlaps partly with our
sample. Therefore we can only use this as an indication of industrial bias of the temporary foreign worker
programs.
35These results are not presented here for the sake of space but are available upon request.
36Such an approach has gained more attention in recent analyzes of international trade and migration
dealing with endogeneity issues. See for instance Spilimbergo (2009) in the context of an analysis of the
impact of foreign student migration on democracy in origin countries.
37The data were obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Statistic Department. More
precisely, the data involves annual entries and re-entries of temporary foreign workers from all countries
of origin to all Canadian provinces from September 1980 to September 2012. Actually, given the second
step, we only use the data relative to the 1987-2009 period. The country of origin of the temporary
migrants is captured by the country of last residence.
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Estimation results suggest that the fit to the data is quite good, with R2 around 0.74.38
In the second step, we use the predicted bilateral flows of the regression models. We sum
the bilateral flows over all countries for each province-year in order to obtain predicted
immigration flows of temporary foreign workers by province. Given that the covariates
in the gravity equation are obviously exogenous with respect to the error term in the
structural equation, this predicted immigration flows can be used as suitable external
instruments in the structural equation.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 provide estimations with instrumented temporary im-
migration. Column(5) reports estimations assuming that the other components of total
immigration are exogenous. In column(6), only permanent international immigration is
considered as exogenous. Interprovincial immigration is instrumented using 2-period lag
total international immigration flows in a similar way as estimations reported in columns
(1) and (3). Results obtained in columns (5) and (6) suggest that statistically speak-
ing, the mitigation effects of temporary international immigration and of interprovincial
immigration are robust to this instrumentation exercise.39 Both estimations show that
there is nevertheless a significant variation in the coefficients related to these immigration
flows. The magnitude of those coefficient produces mitigation effects that are intuitively
excessive, suggesting that the results should be taken with cautious. Nevertheless, the
statistical significance of these immigration flows as well as the finding that the mitiga-
tion effect of temporary immigrants is higher than the one associated to interprovincial
immigration are consistent with the previous estimations.
Further GMM test of remaining endogeneity.
Besides endogeneity of interprovincial migration, omission of other labour supply fac-
tors and measurement issues in the windfall, model (9) might suffer from endogeneity
(or more broadly from mispecification) coming from other channels. Endogeneity might
result from the fact that there are obvious deviations from the underlying assumptions
in the theory and the observed reality at stake. For instance, one might think that,
38The regression is presented in Appendix B.1.
39We are aware that the instrument based on the bilateral migration data is an estimated regressor,
while reported t-statistics are based on the assumption that the data is observed.
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in practice, the share of employment in the non-tradable sector, n, might influence the
real exchange rate, p, causing the two-equation system to be interdependent. Similarly,
learning-by-doing effects would make productivity endogenous to the economic structure
(Gylfason et al., 1999; Torvik, 2001). In the same perspective, the Obstfeld-Rogoff model
assumes full employment while in reality some provinces face significant unemployment
levels (Gross and Schmitt, 2012). Therefore, it might be desirable to test for the em-
pirical relevance of our specification. Strictly speaking, any specification test supporting
our model does not rule out such endogenous effects. However, it might indicate that
feedback effects in our case are either too weak, slow, or well captured by the time and
province fixed effects.
To tackle this potential endogeneity problem, we proceed to a General Methods of
Moments (GMM) estimation of equation (9) by making the best use of the cross-section
and time-series dimension of our data. The idea is quite simple. We can split the sample
into two sub-periods and estimate a system of equations for each sub-sample. The same
model is estimated jointly for the first and second samples with parameter restrictions on
all coefficients that imply the coefficients do not change over time. It allows us to compare
the sample-specific estimates with the ones in the benchmark regression and, in turn, to
test for the relevance of the specification.
Technically speaking, the additional number of moment conditions in the GMM esti-
mation is equal to the number of parameters times the number of sub-samples. The use
of additional moment conditions allows us to conduct an over-identification test. Failure
to reject the null hypothesis tends to suggest that the model in the benchmark regression
does not suffer from misspecification.
The results of this GMM estimation are reported in columns (7) and (8) of Table 6.
The results indicate that the GMM estimation does not reject the restriction that the
coefficients are equal between the two sub-periods at conventional significance levels and
that our model is correctly specified. The impact of temporary international immigration
is less significant, which might be explained by the fact that temporary migration flows
became generalized across provinces only in the second sub-period.
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Table 6: Mitigation effect of total immigration: IV and GMM results
Dependent variable: change in share of N sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimation Method (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (IV) (GMM) (GMM)
Lagged dependent −0.263∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ −0.281∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗
(4.500) (4.780) (4.480) (4.730) (5.609) (4.992) (5.650) (6.040)
Prod Growth in T 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(4.530) (4.200) (4.340) (3.790) (4.165) (4.379) (5.640) (5.580)
Prod Growth in N −0.076∗∗ −0.072∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.076∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.063∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗
(2.060) (1.880) (1.960) (1.870) (3.276) (1.687) (3.770) (3.600)
Resource 0.045∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(3.450) (3.560) (3.510) (3.290) (3.923) (3.515) (3.520) (3.890)
Terms of trade −0.060∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(3.860) (3.880) (3.800) (3.810) (3.140) (3.748) (3.850) (3.800)
Agg. immigration −0.400∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ - - - - −0.222∗∗∗ -
(2.220) (2.560) (3.020)
Net interp. immigr. - - −0.443∗∗ −0.525∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗ −0.656∗∗ - −0.254∗∗∗
(2.240) (2.990) (2.987) (2.317) (3.540)
Temporary immigr. - - −0.554∗ −0.551∗ −1.640∗∗∗ −1.161∗∗ - −0.350∗
(1.880) (1.800) (2.906) (2.377) (1.710)
Permanent immigr. - - −0.072 −0.051 −0.146 −0.311 - 0.104
(0.330) (0.236) (0.459) (0.824) (0.600)
R2 0.401 0.337 0.384 0.355 0.370 0.283 - -
F-stat 1st stage 6.63 4.39 8.50 5.50 19.10 26.87 - -
N. Overid. Rest. 1 1 1 1 0 1 6 8
Overid. T. (p-value) 0.61 0.67 0.86 0.95 - 0.16 0.09 0.10
Observations 190 200 190 200 210 190 210 210
Time Span ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’07 ’87-’97, 98-’07 ’87-’97, 98-’07
Notes: Year and Province fixed effects always included. Cross-section weights used for standard errors.
Column (1) instrument of aggregate immigration: 2-period lagged international perm. and temp. migration.
Column (2) instrument of aggregate immigration: 1-period lagged international perm. and temp. migration
Column (3) instrument of interprov. migration: 2-period lagged international perm. and temp. migration
Column (4) instrument of interprov migration: 1-period lagged international perm. and temp. migration
Column (5): temporary immigration instrumented using 2-step gravity approach (see main text).
Column (6): temporary immigration and interprovincial migration instrumented using predicted temporary migrants from
gravity equation and 2-period lagged international permanent and temporary migration.
Columns (7) and (8): GMM estimation with overidentification through the definition of sub-periods.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.3.2 Accounting for Nickell bias and non-stationarity
The dynamic nature of model (9) raises two further econometric issues. First, there is a
potential issue of non-stationarity of the dependent variable, i.e., ni,t. Two straightforward
arguments in favour of stationarity can nevertheless be put forward: (i) ni,t is a proportion
that is, by definition, bounded; and (ii) the point estimate of the lagged dependant variable
is highly significant and around -0.2. Nevertheless, it might be desirable to test explicitly
for the presence of a unit root. To that aim, Appendix B reports the results of the
panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007). This test allows for the presence of cross-sectional
dependence. The results support the stationarity of ni,t, which is in line with the fact
that our estimations of model (9) in Table 1 give a significantly negative value for the ξ
parameter.
The second issue is the fact that the fixed-effect estimator in model (9) is subject to
the Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981). Indeed, the model is equivalent to a model explaining the
share of the non-tradable sector as a function of its lagged value (and other covariates).
The lagged dependent variable turns out to be correlated with the error term, making
the fixed-effect estimator inconsistent with small samples in terms of time periods (T ).40
This bias is larger the lower the number of time periods but vanishes for T → ∞ (but
not for N →∞). Therefore, concerns about the Nickell bias have arisen mostly in cases
with large N and small T , for instance, in datasets involving individual observations.
Given that we have 22 time periods, one might argue that the Nickell bias is not a major
issue in our analysis. Nevertheless, as a of robustness check, one might look for estimates
accounting for the Nickell bias.
One possibility is to estimate directly model (9) using GMM with expanded moment
conditions that control for the bias. One can, for instance, rely on the popular methods
of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) or of Blundell and Bond (1998).
As stressed by Baltagi (2008), these methods are mostly appropriate with relatively large
40We abuse the notation for T and N here. It should not be confused with notations for the tradable
and non-tradable sectors. They refer here to the cross-section and time-series dimensions of the data
sample. We keep those notations since these are the traditional ones in the econometric literature on
panel data.
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N , and specifically N much larger then T , since they use the time-dimension for the
moment conditions. Given that we have N = 10, those estimators are subject here to
caution. Such dynamic panel GMM estimators also face problems in the presence of
cross-sectional dependence, a feature that is expected here due to the strong links among
Canadian provinces. An alternative way of checking the robustness of our estimates is to
rely on a bias-corrected fixed-effect estimator based on the Kiviet (1995) adjustment. The
Kiviet (1995) adjustment requires the use of a consistent estimator and a correction order.
We use three supposedly consistent estimators (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982; Arellano and
Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) and two correction orders O(T−1) and O((NT )−1).
The results of the Kiviet-adjusted estimates are reported in Table B.3 in Appendix B.
Estimates in Table B.3 show that our initial estimates are robust to the solution of the
Nickell bias, based on the Kiviet (1995) adjustment. Both the values and the significance
of the parameters of equation (9) are extremely similar across estimation methods. In
particular, we find strong support for the Dutch disease effects of resource income and for
a mitigation effect through total immigration.
5.4 Economic relevance of the results and further discussions
To gauge the economic relevance of our results, we consider a few back-of-the-envelope
calculations in the specific case of a booming province, Alberta, that enjoyed a significant
resource boom between 2002 and 2007. The boom was triggered by a sharp increase in the
world price of oil. The average contribution of the resource sector to the gross provincial
product jumped from 24.3% before 2002 to 40.7% afterwards. Over the same period,
total immigration in Alberta increased from 1.7% of total labour per year on average to
3.1% afterwards. A high percentage of migrants came from other provinces (1.3% of total
labour force, 43% of the aggregate migration flow), and through the temporary foreign
worker program (1.4% of total labour force, 47% of the aggregate migration flow), the
rest consisting of permanent immigrants. Using model (8) and the estimates of Table 1,
one can compute the implied Dutch disease effects as well as the mitigation effect exerted
by immigration flows. Given the average share of the non-tradable sector in Alberta, all
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things being equal, the resource boom led to an annual increase of about 1.9% in the size of
the non-tradable sector, of which about half (1%) was mitigated by the inflow of workers.
In terms of percentage points, the share of the non-tradable sector increases from 74.7
to 76.0% without migration, and to 75.2% with the mitigation exerted by immigration.
In this specific case, total immigration dampens 52% of the total Dutch disease effect.
Figures are quite similar if we take into account the type of immigration flows. Based
on the estimates of Table 3, the increase in the non-tradable sector amounts to 2.0% and
0.8%, respectively, without and with immigration. This is a mitigation effect of 61%.
Cumulated effects are more difficult to compute. One of the reasons is that those
calculations assume that the other determinants, such as productivities or the terms of
trade, do not change. This is unrealistic over a medium-run horizon. The second reason is
that, without immigration, Alberta could not have benefited from such a large boom, since
some workers migrated specifically to the oil industry. In other words, resource income
shocks and immigration flows are correlated, which makes separate calculations quite
cumbersome. Third, computing cumulated effects imposes linear assumptions, which are
likely to be violated over time. Finally, the previous calculations take the specific case
of Alberta, a relatively small province. This means that, in relative terms, both the
resource income and the immigration flows are important. It is therefore not surprising
that, at first glance, those effects appear substantial. If we look at other provinces, the
impact is less significant. For instance, if we take Ontario, the largest province that did
not boom and that tended to lose labour through interprovincial emigration, the effect is
much more moderate. Specifically, given the size of the labour force in booming provinces,
the spreading effect of Dutch disease through the net emigration of Ontarian workers as
captured in Table 3 is modest. Furthermore, our theoretical background assumes that
unemployment does not fully respond to the resource boom, which might be too a strong
assumption in practice. If some Ontario emigrants to Alberta were previously unemployed,
the spreading effect is lower than theoretically identified. It therefore is much more likely
that Dutch disease affects Ontario more through the real appreciation of the Canadian
dollar caused by the surge in commodity prices (Beine et al., 2012).
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Our results are therefore fully consistent with the “Alberta effect” as previously identi-
fied by Corden (1984) and Helliwell (1981). The windfall associated with a boom increases
the attractiveness of the province through public investment and amenities funded by the
taxes raised by the provincial government. This attracts migrants, either from other
provinces or from abroad. This immigration in turn mitigates the Dutch disease effect.
It should be stressed that this mechanism works regardless of the existence of a resource
movement effect. In other words, the resource sector does not need to attract workers
from other sectors for the mitigation effect to take place. If the resource sector attracts
workers, then immigration mitigates both the spending and the resource movement effects
of the boom. If the resource sector does not attract workers, only the spending effect is
mitigated.
One might also claim that part of the mitigation effect of the Dutch disease is asso-
ciated with the attraction of capital; our results do not rule this out. In the long run,
complementarity between labour and capital prevails, both in resource and other sectors.
Labour is therefore also needed for the sectors to survive or to expand. Given the in-
tegration of Canada, both internally and internationally, capital is not expected to be
the binding factor in the long run. In contrast, there is evidence that labour supply has
significantly constrained the development of some activities in Canada. The fact that
temporary workers and their employers are subject to strict regulation and labour mar-
ket tests but nonetheless their share is increasing for all provinces, especially since 2000,
shows that labour demand has regularly exceeded labour supply in many sectors. In that
respect, our paper quantifies the mitigation effect that is associated primarily with the
binding factor, namely, labour.
Recently, there were many heated debates between Canadians about the positive and
negative effects of resource extraction at the Canadian level. For instance, the prime min-
ister of Ontario emphasized that oil extraction in Alberta leads to a significant decrease
in Ontario’s exports of manufacturing goods.41 In terms of policy implications, our anal-
ysis shows that temporary foreign worker programs are an important tool for mitigating
41See Globe and Mail, February 27, 2012.
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possible undesirable spillovers of that kind. Unlike interprovincial migration that leads
to unequally distributed effects across provinces, the inflow of temporary foreign workers
benefits all provinces in terms of mitigation. Furthermore, recent agreements between
Citizenship and Immigration Canada give more power to the provincial authorities and
allow them to tailor the intensity of the programs to their need.
6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the issue of Dutch disease and the possible mitigation effect asso-
ciated with an inflow of workers. The Dutch disease effect at stake here is an increase
in the size of the non-tradable sector of the economy, benefiting from a resource income.
The components of the Dutch disease addressed here are the traditional spending effect
associated with the resource windfall and, to a lesser extent, the resource movement effect
due to the attraction of workers by the resource sector. We first present a model with a
varying labour supply due to the inflow of workers. In that model, immigration dampens
the increase in the size of the non-tradable sector. Furthermore, the model identifies the
other determinants of the size of the non-tradable sector at equilibrium. These include
both the resource and the non-tradable sectors’ productivities and relative prices between
regions.
We test the predictions of the model using data on Canadian provinces over the period
ranging from 1987 to 2009. Canada is an interesting case study since it includes booming
and non-booming provinces. Provinces such as Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfound-
land enjoy windfalls from the extraction of natural resources, while other provinces like
Quebec and Ontario rely much more on manufacturing activities. Previous studies clearly
emphasize the case of Dutch disease in Canada due to the strong increase in the price
of the commodities produced in Canada. An additional appealing feature about using
Canada for this study is that data on immigration and emigration are available at the
provincial level, along with data on international migration. This allows us to account
for the mitigation effect associated with different types of migration, namely, temporary
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international immigration, permanent international immigration, and interprovincial mi-
gration. Finally, the possibility of investigating the Dutch disease phenomenon within
regions of the same country allows us to control for national factors such as institutions.
This is important, given the literature’s emphasis on institutional factors in explaining
the natural resource curse.
We find confirmation of Dutch disease in Canadian provinces. Booming provinces
tend to face an increase in the share of the non-tradable sector at the expense of the
tradable sector. This impact is larger the greater the resource income shock. Immigration
tends to mitigate this effect. Our results are fully consistent with the so-called ”Alberta
effect” identified theoretically in early studies of the 1980s. Our analysis is the first one
testing explicitly for such an effect associated with immigration. It also shows that this
mitigation effect is associated with specific immigration flows, namely, those involving
temporary foreign workers as well as interprovincial migrants. Those migration flows are
most responsive to labour market conditions within each province. In contrast, permanent
immigrants who are selected through the traditional federal point system do not dampen
the increase in the non-tradable sector.
This observed inefficiency of the permanent immigrant program in dampening regional
Dutch disease is likely to change in the future when the modifications to the selection
mechanism, announced by the Canadian federal government in March 2012, are fully
implemented. With the proposed changes, more weight would be given to labour market
conditions; candidates with a job offer from a Canadian employer would be fast-tracked.
In the actual process, lags between application and eventual admission are measured in
years and the selection does not take into consideration the choices of Canadian employers.
With the proposed changes, Canadian employers would substitute for civil servants as
immigration agents. With the changes, we predict that the permanent immigrant program
would exert a similar mitigation effect as the temporary immigrant program.
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A Appendix: Model Derivation
A.1 Supply side
There are two sectors, N and T with Cobb-Douglas technology.
YN = ANK
αN
N (nL)
1−αN , (A.1)
YT = ATK
αT
T ((1− n)L)
1−αT , (A.2)
αi ≤ 1 for i = N, T.
A.2 Demand side
Consumers maximize utility in the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods.
Aggregate utility takes the following CES-function in those two goods,
U =
[
γ
1/θ(CT )
θ−1/θ + (1− γ)
1/θ(CN)
θ−1/θ
]θ/θ−1
, (A.3)
with aggregate budget constraint,
Z = CT + pCN = wL+ r(Q+R), (A.4)
with p the relative price of non-tradable goods in terms of tradable goods. R is the resource
windfall coming from the extraction of natural resources. Q is the total domestic financial
wealth that includes KN and KT and that is, under full capital mobility, supposed to be
constant with :
Q ≡ B + δ(KN +KT ), (A.5)
with B being the domestic assets held on the rest of the world, and δ the share of domestic
ownership of capital producing domestically.
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A.3 Non-tradable goods
The nature of non-tradable goods implies the following constraint:
CN = YN . (A.6)
Using equation (A.6), the share of the non-tradable sector can be expressed as:
n =
YN
ANk
αN
N L
, (A.7)
where kN ≡
KN
nL
.
A.4 First-order conditions
First order conditions for capital, labour, and consumption are given by :
piαiAik
αi−1
i = r, (A.8)
pi(1− αi)Aik
αi
i = w, (A.9)
γ
1− γ
CN
CT
= p−θ, (A.10)
(A.11)
for i = N, T . Note that by normalization, pT = 1 and pN = p.
Using the budget constraint (equation (A.4), equation (A.6) can be rewritten as
CN =
Z(1− γ)p−θ
γ + (1− γ)p1−θ
. (A.12)
A.5 Equilibrium values for p and n
Equilibrium value for p can be derived by combining (A.8) and (A.9),
p =
(
1− αT
1− αN
)1−αN ααT 1−αN1−αTT
ααNN
A
1−αN
1−αT
T
AN
r
αN−
αT (1−αN )
1−αT . (A.13)
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Rewriting (A.7) by using (A.8)-(A.12) gives
n =
(
(1− αN )(1− γ)p
−θ
γ + (1− γ)p1−θ
)((
r
ααTT AT
) 1
1−αT
(
Q+R
(1− αT )L
))
. (A.14)
A.6 Comparative Statics
Equilibrium values of endogeneous variables can be expressed in relative variations, with
x̂ = d ln(x). Due to perfect capital mobility, we have that rˆ = 0. Note that, by choice of
the numeraire, p̂T = 0.
The comparative statics of nˆ, rˆ and wˆ are given by:
nˆ = cˆN − αN kˆN − AˆN − Lˆ, (A.15)
rˆ = 0 = pˆi + Aˆi + (αi − 1)kˆi, (A.16)
wˆ = pˆi + Aˆi + αikˆi. (A.17)
Due to perfect mobility of factors between sectors that implies full equalization of wage,
the last equation can be reexpressed as:
wˆ =
1
1− αT
AˆT .
The comparative statics for consumption, wealth, and p (the real exchange rate) are
given by:
cˆN = zˆ − [γθ + (1− γ)]pˆ, (A.18)
zˆ = ψL(wˆ + Lˆ) + ψKRˆ, (A.19)
pˆ =
1− αN
1− αT
AˆT − AˆN . (A.20)
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where ψj refers to the share of income of factor j = K, L in total income. Those
shares are defined as
ψL =
wL
wL+ r(Q+R)
, ψK =
r(Q+R)
wL+r(Q+R)
,
with ψL + ψK = 1.
All those expressions can be combined to get the equilibrium value of the change in n:
nˆ =
ψL
1− αT
AˆT + ψKRˆ−
(
γθ + (1− γ) +
αN
1− αN
)
pˆ−
1
1− αN
AˆN − (1− ψL)Lˆ. (A.21)
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B Appendix: Bilateral Migration, Unit Roots and
Nickell (1981) Bias
B.1 Bilateral Migration
We report here the estimation results of the small gravity model which is used to create
an external instrument for temporary foreign workers. The regression uses yearly inflows
of temporary foreign workers from each origin country of the world to each Canadian
province. As independent variables we use the bilateral distance (between the capital
of the origin country and the capital of the Canadian province) and an indicator for
common language, either English or French. The language is based on both official and
commonly used language in the country. The bilateral predicted flows are summed up
for each province to create a predicted total flow of temporary foreign workers for each
province. The predicted values from the regression of the third column are used for the
instrumentation in the text. Results in columns (1) and (2) are reported here only for
the sake of information.
Table B.1: Bilateral Migration
log of bilateral temporary foreign worker
(1) (2) (3)
log distance −1.413∗∗∗ −1.359∗∗∗ −1.371∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.105) (0.108)
common EN 0.770∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.050)
common FR 1.413∗∗∗ 1.439∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067)
Observations 9959 9959 9959
Adj. R2 0.696 0.716 0.738
origin FE yes yes yes
destination FE yes yes yes
dest·time FE no no yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01
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B.2 Unit root tests
Results on unit root tests on ni,t are presented in this section. The panel unit root test
with cross sectional dependence is the one proposed by Pesaran (2007). The unit root
test boils down to a t-test for H0 : ρ¯∗i = 0 in the following regression model involving the
variable of interest yi,t :
∆yi,t = αi + ρ
∗
i yi,t−1 + d0y¯t−1 +
p∑
j=0
dj+1∆y¯t−j +
p∑
k=1
ck∆yi,t−k + εi,t.
The test statistics of the unit root test is denoted by t¯. Critical values for α equal at 1, 5
and 10 percent are reported, too. See lower panel of Table B.2.
These unit root tests allow us to account for two important features of the data. First,
they are conducted in a panel framework. Results from univariate unit root tests tend
to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in ni,t for most series. Nevertheless, for a
subset of series, the null was not rejected. The results are not presented here due to space
constraints but are available on request. One reason for the non-rejection of the unit root
is the low power of those tests, which is amplified here by the small number of time-series
observations (T = 21). The second feature is that the panel unit root tests should allow
for the presence of cross-sectional dependence. Cross-sectional dependence is expected
here due to the significant economic links among Canadian provinces. This is confirmed
by the results of the test of cross-sectional dependence proposed by Pesaran (2004b). The
underlying null hypothesis is H0 : ¯ˆr = 0. The test statistic CD is asymptotically normally
distributed. (See upper panel in Table B.2.)
Results are presented in Table B1. Both tests are computed for three lag structures,
i.e. 1, 2 and 3 lagged values of the dependent variable.
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Table B.2: Cross Dependence and panel unit root test on ni,t
lag length 1 2 3
Cross-sectional dependence test
¯ˆr 0.150 0.174 0.119
CD 4.60∗∗∗ 5.36∗∗∗ 3.65∗∗∗
Panel Unit Root test
Critical Value 1% −2.60
(T=20, N=10) 5% −2.34
10% −2.21
t¯ −2.67∗∗∗ −2.46∗∗ −2.36∗∗
Cross-sectional dependence (CD) and cross-section
augmented DF (CADF) tests following Pesaran (2004a, 2007).
¯ˆr =
(
2
N(N−1)
)∑N−1
i=1
∑N
j=i+1 rˆij , and CD =
[
TN(N−1)
2
]1/2
¯ˆr
CD is asymptotically normally distributed around H0 : ¯ˆr = 0
t¯ is the simple average of the individual t-statistics on ρ∗i and
has critical values for H0 : unit root, reported in
Pesaran (2007, Table II(b)).
**: stat. < 5% crit. val., ***: stat. < 1% crit. val.
B.3 Nickell bias and Kiviet-corrected fixed-effect estimates
This section presents the results of the fixed-effect (FE) estimates of model (9) using bias
corrections in the spirit of Kiviet (1995). Basically, the idea of the Kiviet adjustment
is based on an estimation of the Nickell bias in case of fixed T . Nickell (1981) already
provided an estimation of the bias of the FE estimator for N → +∞ of order O(1/T ).
Kiviet (1995) derives an approximation of the bias of higher order.
The Kiviet-adjusted estimates of model (9) are based on the use of a consistent esti-
mator in presence of some dynamics. The estimation of the model using those consistent
estimators provides an estimate of the bias for a given order, which in turn is used to ad-
just the initial estimates of the FE estimator. Three consistent estimators are used here:
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) (AH hereafter), Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB), and Blundell
and Bond (1998) (BB). Two orders of correction are used: O(1/T ) and O(1/NT ).
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Table B.3: Robustness test: Kiviet-adjusted FE estimation.
Dependent variable: change in share of N Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimator FGLS PLS AH AB BB AH AB BB
Bias correction O(1/T ) O(1/T ) O(1/T ) O(1/NT ) O(1/NT ) O(1/NT )
Lagged dependent −0.260∗∗∗ −0.232∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.059) (0.053) (0.047) (0.044) (0.051) (0.047) (0.045)
Change in T sector 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Change in N sector −0.100∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026)
Resource 0.037∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Terms of trade −0.056∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Total immigration −0.245∗∗∗ −0.188∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.070) (0.070) (0.057) (0.063) (0.068) (0.057) (0.063)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210 210 210
Provinces 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Columns (3)-(8): reported corrected FE estimates using Anderson-Hsiao (AH), Arellano-Bond (AB)
and Blundell-Bond (BB) with bias correction of Order(1/X). Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
In columns (1)-(2) robust standard errors; in (3)-(8) bootstrap standard errors using 100 replications.
***: p<0.01, **: p<0.05.
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